Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach by Hernandez, Tanya K.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2002
Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A
Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach
Tanya Kateri Hernandez
Fordham University School of Law, THERNANDEZ@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach , 63 La. L. Rev. 875
(2002-2003)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/22
Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A
Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach
Tanya Kateri Herndndez*
Studies consistently demonstrate that the act of judging is
influenced by judges' personal perspectives and experiences. For
instance, research has demonstrated that empirically U.S. Supreme
Court justices' behavior is motivated, in large part, by their
individual attitudes orjudicial philosophies.' In addition, research on
the U.S. chief justice's distribution of opinion assignments also
suggests that ideology plays a role inasmuch as those justices whose
preferences are more closely aligned with the chief justice will be
assigned to author opinions.2 Furthermore, empirical research
indicates that the influence of ideology on judges also extends to
federal appellate court judges in race relations cases.3 Transnational
comparative research also suggests that the politicized conduct of
judges is not exclusive to the United States.4 For instance, in a recent
comparison of the judicial task ofmaking opinion assignments within
the United States, Canada (post-Charter years) and South Africa
(apartheid era), the study found that chiefjustices in all the countries
did not assign judges to panels randomly, but rather were influenced
by the ideology of the sitting judge and the issues presented in the
case.5 The study concluded that judging is a political behavior that
exhibits similar influence to ideology, despite the vastly different
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1. See David W. Rohde & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making
(1976); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model (1993); Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority
Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court (1999).
2. See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use ofPower in the Supreme Court: The Opinion
Assignments ofEarl Warren, 1953-1960, 19 J. ofPub. L. 49 (1970). See also Segal
& Spaeth, supra note 1.
3. Burton M. Atkins & William Zavonia, Judicial Leadership on the Court
of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Relations Cases
on the Fifth Circuit, 18 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 701 (1974).
4. See Lee Epstein, The Comparative Advantage 9, 1 Law and the Courts:
Newsletter of the Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science
Association 3 (1999).
5. Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie, Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of
Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Division,
37 Law & Soc. Rev. 635 (2003).
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structural legal systems forjudging that can exist.6 Is it then possible
that John Valery White's "activist insecurity" theory discussed in this
volume is applicable beyond the United States context from which he
develops the theory?7
John White's activist insecurity theory posits that from the
inception of civil rights legislation, judges in the United States have
demonstrated an unease with affecting social change, based on the
mostly unstated notion with no legal basis that courts should not
change the social status quo absent extraordinary reasons for doing
so. In the search to adhere to a vision of judicial behavior that is
formalistic and is not activist, even when the law itself prescribes
such change, judges in the United States have felt constrained by a
cultural norm White terms "the activist insecurity." The irony, of
course, is that the activist insecurity leads judges to avoid the full
implications of enforcing civil rights statutes in a way that
demonstrates what White calls a "troubling lack of allegiance' to
formalistic applications of the law. The activist insecurity theory
highlights the way in which the image the judiciary has of itself as an
institution limits what it is actually empowered to do. According to
White, this in turn has led to the demise of civil rights in the United
States because it is not viewed as "real law." Because White's in-
depth excavation of all the civil rights cases that demonstrate the
activist insecurity is such a massive undertaking, what is left for
another day is the question of why civil rights law codified by statute
and well established by precedent does not seem like real law to
jurists.
Accordingly, this essay builds upon John White's
conceptualization of activist insecurity, by deploying the analytical
tools of Critical Race Theory. Specifically, this essay will first use
a Critical Race Theory analysis to explain how unconscious racism
is broadly involved in the manifestation of activist insecurity. The
essay will then illustrate how the Critical Race Theory understanding
of activist insecurity as emanating from unconscious racism thereby
implicates not only the enforcement of U. S. civil rights laws, but
also the civil rights enforcement of countries internationally. By way
of example, the essay demonstrates how the activist insecurity
concept is relevant in Latin America. The essay then concludes by
proposing a Critical Race Praxis-inspired remedy of Critical Race
Theory-infused judicial training to address the manifestation of
activist insecurity transnationally.
6. Id. at 654.
7. John Valery White, The Activist Insecurity and the Demise of Civil Rights
Law, 63 La. L. Rev. 783 (2003).
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I. A CRITICAL RACE THEORY ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCE OF
ACTIVIST INSECURITY
Critical Race Theory has much to offer in understanding the
judicial activist insecurity that permeates not only conservative judges
but liberal judges as well. Critical Race Theory is a strain of legal
scholarship that challenges the ways in which race and racial power are
constructed and represented in legal culture and, more generally, in
society as a whole. Critical Race Theory scholar Girardeau Spann has
long noted that because jurists have been socialized by the dominant
culture,
they have internalized the basic values and assumptions of that
culture, including the beliefs and predispositions that can cause
the majority to discount minority interests.... Moreover, to
the extent that the justice has been socialized to share
majoritarian prejudices, he or she may not even be consciously
aware of the nature of those prejudices, or the degree to which
they influence the exercise of the justices's discretion.9
What Critical Race Theory has contributed to our knowledge about
race relations is the power of demonized racial categories to taint
whatever they are associated with. Thus, while many judges may
harbor no purposeful disregard for fully enforcing civil rights, as
members of society they are just as susceptible to internalizing the
cultural disdain for anything that comes to be identified with the needs
of subjugated communities. And as legal scholar Charles Lawrence
has long observed, the cultural disdain is often unconscious" and thus
easily pervades perspectives about enterprises most closely associated
with the needs of people of color. For instance, scholars who have
studied the demise of the War on Poverty and New Society programs
of the 1960's note the manner in which its links to Black civil rights led
to the decline in public support for the programs. 2 Similarly, when
8. Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement
(Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 2-9 (2001).
9. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1971 (1990).
10. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 380 (1987) ("Judges
are not immune from our culture's racism, nor can they escape the psychological
mechanisms that render us all to some extent, unaware of our racist beliefs ....
Judges continue to come primarily from elite white backgrounds. They
undoubtedly share the values and perceptions of that subculture, which may well
be insensitive or even antagonistic toward the values, needs, and experiences of
blacks and other minorities.").
11. Id. at 332.
12. See Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the
War on Poverty 28-31 (1994) (discussing the demise of the War on Poverty
2003]
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real estate markets come to be associated as being predominantly of
color, they are viewed as less desirable; 3 and when particular jobs and
sectors of the labor market come to be associated with people of color,
they are viewed as less prestigious. 4 Therefore, as Derrick Bell states,
in a context in which the law "has always been a powerful expression
of ruling interests,"' 5 it would be logical that laws not associated with
the ruling interests would be viewed as not "real law." Indeed, implicit
in the neo-conservative critique of civil rights activists'
"misinterpretation" of civil rights laws is the notion that the ability to
change the racial status quo is not a role for real law to begin with. 6
In short, activist insecurity may stem not only from what John White
describes as a self-imposed vision of judicial behavior that is purely
formalistic, but also from the societal disdain that accompanies
anything that comes to be closely associated with the needs of people
of color.
Consequently, activist insecurity may not exclusively be an
outgrowth of the U.S. legal culture, but may instead be more generally
manifested wherever longstanding racial discrimination and social
exclusion has existed. What then does this portend for those societies
outside of the United States that are just beginning to seek mechanisms
for bolstering the enforcement of more efficacious civil rights laws?
II. THE ACTIVIST INSECURITY ABROAD: THE LATIN AMERICAN
CASE STUDY
In response to evolving civil rights movements in Latin America,
governmental leaders have recently expressed interest in devising
because of its links to black civil rights programs that used federal funds to:
empower community action groups run by local black activists; provide affirmative
action and job training programs to break long-standing racial barriers to union
jobs; and to provide housing subsidies to those otherwise locked into substandard
housing).
13. Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question
ofRacial Occupancy Controls, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 245,251-54 (1974) (discussing the
concept of the racial "tipping point" at which white families have been documented
to flee a neighborhood because its growing numbers of black residents will mark
it as a "Black neighborhood"). See also Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property
Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 1051 (1998).
14. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Gender and Racial Inequality at Work: The
Sources and Consequences of Job Segregation (1993).
15. Derrick A. Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: the Permanence of
Racism 94 (1992).
16. Compare Kimber1M Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, andRetrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1331, 1339-41 (1988) (analyzing neo-conservative scholar Thomas Sowell's
critique of civil rights activists who expansively view the law as a vehicle for
obtaining equal results rather than simply equal treatment, and observing his
inability to identify "what the real law is").
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legal methods for combating racial discrimination.1 7 In fact, the
Organization of American States adopted a resolution at its General
Assembly held in Santiago, Chile, in June of 2003, which directs the
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights to report on the ways
in which various Latin American countries that are state members have
enacted legal measures to combat discrimination in compliance with
the 1965 United Nations International Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Furthermore, in June 2002 the
Inter-American Development Bank held a two-day conference in
which they brought community activists from throughout Latin
America to meet with U.S. scholars from many disciplines to discuss
the issue of racial justice. It is the Bank's concern that the loans they
extend to many Latin American countries are not fully effective at
improving the lives of those countries' citizens, due in large part from
the socio-economic barriers of anti-Black racism and bias against
indigenous populations. But what hope do these nascent efforts in
Latin America have if activist insecurity is a concept that is endemic
to civil rights judicial enforcement favoring subordinated
communities?
It is not all precipitous to consider the possible effects of an activist
insecurity in the context of Latin American civil rights judicial
enforcement, considering the fact that judicial reform has long been an
issue of concern in Latin America. In particular, the 1980's began an
intensive period ofjudicial reform funding from the United States as
part of its overall foreign policy effort to promote democracy abroad."8
Funding was provided, in part, to increase judicial personnel training,
increase judicial sector budgets and to ameliorate judicial career
standards.19 The judicial reform priorities were set in response to
country assessments which indicated that judges in the hemisphere
were routinely denied basic resources like training, staff, basic legal
materials, updated codes, sound court buildings, and decent salaries.2"
Furthermore, the assessments stated that judges were often subject to
political influence, conflicts of interest, and outright corruption.2'
Since that time, the judiciary in Latin America is still perceived
by all of its users to be in a state of crisis,22 and the countries of the
17. The countries where notable civil rights movements have emerged are
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and more recently in Mexico. See
Alison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village 72 (2000); Black Brazil:
Culture, Identity, and Social Mobilization 15-51 (Larry Crook & Randal Johnson
eds., 1999).
18. Jos6 E. Alvarez, Promoting the "Rule ofLaw'"in Latin America: Problems
and Prospects, 25 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 281, 281 (1991).
19. Id. at 289-90.
20. Id. at 294.
21. Id. at 294-95.
22. Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean:
2003] 879
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region consider justice reform to be a priority.2 3 Opinion polls
routinely demonstrate that citizens have little expectation of fair
treatment by the Latin American judicial systems and that these
institutions are the least respected in the public or private sectors.24
Specifically, judges are often thought to make erroneous decisions
because they do not understand the substantive facts of a case.2"
Corruption continues to run rampant because finding for the
judiciary is contingent upon the political will.2 6 Furthermore, while
the general public perceives the judicial appointment process to be
political, secretive, and thus without public accountability,27 low-
income citizens have a particularly low level of confidence in the
judicial system.28 Yet, judicial reform efforts continue. For example,
in Brazil, the 1988 Constitution mandated external monitoring of
court services.29 Since 1988, some Brazilian states require career
training to enter the judiciary in addition to the competitive test
already nationally required.30 In order to prevent excessive secrecy
in the appointments process, Brazil requires that twenty percent of
any given court's membership be drawn from the Brazilian Bar
Association and from the public prosecutor's office.31
As a result of the public focus on judicial corruption in Latin
America it is quite probable that its judges may be just as constrained
by activist insecurity as judges in the United States. The image of
being an activist jurist may be interpreted through the history of
politically corrupt judges." In fact, the existence of rampant anti-
Black and anti-indigenous sentiment in Latin America and the
Caribbean social contexts, may very well lead its jurists to similarly
unconsciously misperceive civil rights laws as not being real law.
3
Elements of Reform 1 (1996).
23. Christina Biebesheimer, Justice Reform in Latin America and the
Caribbean: The IDB Perspective, in Rule of Law in Latin America: The
International Promotion of Judicial Reform 99,99 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder
eds., 2001).
24. Lin A. Hammergren, The Politics of Justice and Justice Reform in Latin
America 4 (1988).
25. Id. at 4.
26. Dakolias, supra note 22, at 25-26.
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 36.
29. Jos6 Renato Nalini, Judicial Reform in Brazil, in Judicial Reform in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Proceedings of a World Bank Conference 172
(Malcom Rowat, et al. eds., 1995).
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id. at 172.
32. Hammergren, supra note 24, at 31 ("reform is unpredictable where an
activist judiciary may not be a neutral arbiter, but rather another political actor").
33. See Tanya Kateri Hernndez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race
Ideology in the Enforcement ofAntidiscrimination Laws, A United States - Latin
880 [Vol. 63
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Commentators note that social discrimination and class bias are still
strong in the Latin American legal system. Accordingly, in order
for civil rights to be meaningful in Latin America, activist insecurity
must be addressed within the larger context ofjudicial reform.3 ' And
yet the mechanism for addressing judicial activist insecurity may not
be very different in Latin America than it is for the United States,
given the centrality of unconscious racism in both contexts. Judicial
training may offer one path.
I. A CRITICAL RACE PRAxIS REMEDY TO ACTIVIST INSECURITY:
JUDICIAL TRAINING
Because the text of civil rights laws is not able to mitigate the
undermining influence of judicial activist insecurity,36 perhaps the
primary way to counteract its effects is by directly addressing it in the
form of judicial training sessions. This approach would be in the
spirit of a Critical Race Praxis approach to socio-legal problem
solving. Critical Race Praxis is a strand of Critical Race Theory that
examines the connection between theory and practical work aimed at
transforming concrete social institutions. 37 Frequently, Critical Race
Praxis "combines critical pragmatic analysis with political lawyering
and community organizing to practice justice for racialized
communities. It's central idea is racial justice as antisubordination
practice., 38 But more importantly critical race praxis envisions racial
justice practice as something more than the enforcement of civil
rights laws.39 Accordingly, one way to address the activist insecurity
ofjudges is to directly address the issue within the context ofjudicial
America Comparison, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1093, 1125-26 (2002) (discussing the
continued existence of racism in Latin America and the Caribbean).
34. Compare Brysk, supra note 17, at 258 (discussing the Ecuadorian legal
system within the context of all of Latin America and stating "[s]ocial
discrimination and class bias are still strong in the legal system as in society at
large").
35. The larger context ofjudicial reform must address the fact that historically
"[c]onstitutional guarantees have often provided little or no protection in practice
for weak and vulnerable groups," and that "powerful elites tend to operate 'above'
or 'outside' the law; impunity is widespread and powerful wrongdoers are rarely
made accountable through legal means." Rachel Sieder, Conclusions: Promoting
the Rule of Law in Latin America, in Rule of Law in Latin America: The
International Promotion of Judicial Reform 142, 151 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel
Sieder eds., 2001).
36. White, supra note 7.
37. Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge 591 (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, 2d ed. 2000).
38. Eric K. Yamamoto, Interracial Justice: Conflict & Reconciliation in Post-
Civil Rights America 129 (1999).
39. Id. at 139.
2003]
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training seminars. The inspiration for such a proposal stems from the
legal revolution that is now occurring in post-apartheid South Africa.
The post-apartheid South African context is one in which judicial
training has been utilized to transform apartheid racial and gender
constructs. Social scientist Patrick Lynn Rivers has closely examined
the South African context and he notes that with the benefit of legal
scholarship from Critical Race Theorists in the United States, "[s]tate
actors in South Africa who take account of the politics of racial
constructs have done something that is largely undone in the United
States: directly draw[n] upon and attempt ed] to apply United States
critical race theory in judicial practice.'" In fact, the South Africa
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
of 2000 mandates judicial training in its provisions in order to
designate particularjudges and magistrates as having the authority to
run "equality courts" with particular expertise. But what is
particularly noteworthy about the post-apartheid South African
initiative is its training focus on spurring social transformation in and
through law. The resources from which training curricula are
formulated contain modules on the judicial necessity of considering
social context and the existence of broad social and economic
inequalities by race, along with the recognition that biases and
stereotypes can operate in the process of judicial decision-making.4
While such progressive judicial training does not exist in the
United States or Latin America, it is possible to infuse the current
training options which exist forjudges in the United States and Latin
America, with deeper considerations of civil rights laws that directly
address erroneous but often unconscious application of activist
insecurity. Judicial training is not mandated for federal and state
judges in the United States, but is often offered through a variety of
institutions because judges have been perceived to be enthusiastic
about their voluntary training sessions. 2 For instance, the Judicial
Education Reference, Information, and Technical Transfer Project(JERITT) is a national clearinghouse for information on state
national, and federal-system judicial branch education options. 3
Since 1967, the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") has offered judicial
40. Patrick Lynn Rivers, Judicial Training and Social Transformation in Post-
apartheid South Africa (unpublished paper presented at Law and Society
Association 2003 Annual Meeting, June 8, 2003, Pittsburgh, PA) (on file with
author).
41. Id. at 9-10.
42. Stuart Gorin & David Pitts, Continuing Legal Education: Three
Organizations That Fulfill the Need, Issues of Democracy, Aug. 2002, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itdhr/0802/ijde/gorinpitts.htm (last visited 9/23/03).
43. Michigan State University, Judicial Education Reference, Information and
Technical Transfer Project (JERITT) at http://jeritt.msu.edu (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
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continuing education workshops at the federal level. The FJC is an
independent education and research agency within thejudicial branch
of the United States government that receives government funding to
conduct education and training programs for federal judges and court
employees." The FJC offers judicial training on such topics as recent
developments injurisdiction, evidence, sentencing, employment law,
genetic research, and international litigation. Furthermore, the FJC
has offered small group special-topic seminars on civil rights
litigation.4" A private organization that offers judicial training to
state and federal judges alike, is the National Judicial College
("NJC"). The NJC was established in 1963 by the American Bar
Association as a private, non-profit educational institution, offering
a variety of courses to more than 2,000 judges and other court
officials each year.46 The NJC curriculum concentrates on the art and
skill of judging and new trends in the law. At the state level, a
variety of different institutions offer judicial training.47
In Latin America, much of the judicial training that exists is
funded by a variety of international entities (bilateral aid agencies,
the multilateral development banks, United Nations, Organization of
American States and private foundations).4" Consequently, the
content of judicial training sessions is influenced by what such
organizations are willing to fund. For instance, in the panoply of law
reform funded projects it is rare to find any projects that support legal
services for the poor or disadvantaged,49 although funding is provided
for training ofjudges.5" The United States Agency for International
Development has increasingly emphasized the training ofjudges and
support of judicial schools in its funding of law reform projects in
44. Judicial Training Institutions, Issues of Democracy, Dec. 1996, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itdhr/1296/ijde/njcprofi.htm) (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
45. Stuart Gorin & David Pitts, Continuing Legal Education: Three
Organizations That Fulfill the Need, Issues of Democracy, Aug. 2002, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itdhr/0802/ijde/gorinpitts.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., History and Description of the Institute of Continuing Judicial
Education of Georgia, at http://www.uga.edu/icje/history.htm (modified Feb. 21,
2002).
48. Thomas Carothers, The Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin
America, in Rule of Law in Latin America: The International Promotion of Judicial
Reform 4 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
49. Luis Salas, From Law and Development to Rule of Law: New and Old
Issues in Justice Reform in Latin Ameri~a, in The Rule of Law in Latin America:
The International Promotion of Judicial Reform 17, 27(Pilar Domingo & Rachel
Sieder eds., 2001). But the Inter-American Development Bank has begun to fund
projects that focus on access to justice by disenfranchised citizens like minorities
and the poor. See Biebesheimer, supra note 23, at 103
50. Biebesheimer, supra note 23, at 101.
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Latin America." Other institutionally funded law reform efforts
often include training for judges. 2
Yet, despite the funding constraint, it is encouraging to note that
in those Latin American countries in which judges have been asked
about the utility of training sessions, they have emphasized that such
training encourages them to study more closely the problems with the
legal system in their own countries.53 In fact, the interest in law
reform is rising in most Latin American countries,54 and has recently
become prominent in political discourse.5 Furthermore, Non-
Governmental Organizations agitating for judicial reform have
frequently promoted the interests of ethnic minority groups,56 and
have been an integral part in strengthening the rule of law in the
region.57
Thus, with the existence of various judicial training venues in the
United States and Latin America, it is plausible to consider the
possibility of adding a training component to address the issue of
civil rights enforcement and the activist insecurity that impedes civil
rights adjudication. While it is not the purpose of this essay to set out
all the details of such a training workshop, a number of particular
elements might be especially useful to consider. The training manual
for trainers and participants should begin by including excerpts from
John White's article describing activist insecurity and how it
interferes with an appropriate adjudication of civil rights laws." The
manual should also include excerpts from Charles Lawrence's
seminal article about the manifestation of unconscious racism in legal
actors,59 and Kimberl6 Crenshaw's article about the importance of an
expansive view of civil rights.' What the combination of such
excerpts would provide is the exposure of the phenomenon of activist
insecurity along with a framework of unconscious racism for
understanding why it occurs, and an ideological perspective of
51. Margaret J. Sarles, USAID's Support ofJustice Reform in Latin America,
in Rule of Law in Latin America: The International Promotion of Judicial Reform
47, 52, 54 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
52. Maria Dakolias, Legal and Judicial Reform: The Role of Civil Society in
the Reform Process, in Rule of Law in Latin America: The International Promotion
of Judicial Reform 80, 81 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
53. Rogelio Perez Perdomo, Training Programsfor Judges, in Judicial Reform
in Latin America and the Caribbean: Proceedings of a World Bank Conference 108,
111 (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds. 1995) (discussing anecdotal evidence from judges
in El Salvador and Venezuela).
54. Carothers, supra note 48, at 4.
55. Sieder, supra note 35, at 154.
56. Id. at 85.
57. Id. at 96.
58. White, supra note 7, at 826.
59. Lawrence, supra note 10.
60. Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1341.
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expansive civil rights for addressing activist insecurity. The
expansive civil rights perspective delineated by KimberlM Crenshaw
stresses equality as a result, and looks to real consequences
for African-Americans [and other subordinated populations].
It interprets the objective of antidiscrimination law as the
eradication of the substantive conditions of Black [and other]
subordination and attempts to enlist the institutional power of
the courts to further the national goal of eradicating the
effects of racial oppression.
Within the presentation of the expansive view of civil rights, a
discussion of Owen Fiss' antisubordination approach to the Equal
Protection Clause 6' could also be made, because of the pervasive use
of this same equality principle in most Latin American
constitutions. 6' The antisubordination principle views the Equal
Protection Clause as prohibiting a law or official practice that
aggravates the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged
group. The antisubordination principle stands in contrast to the more
restrictive formality approach that understands equal protection to be
satisfied with simplistic equal treatment. With the examination of the
expansive view of civil right laws, the training manual would then be
primed to introduce the few examples that currently exist of judges
who have utilized Critical Race Theory in the adjudication of their
cases to advance an expansive and antisurbodination view of civil
rights.63 Suggestions for how to employ an expansive view of civil
rights might also be distilled from Christopher Bracey's recent
comparison of antisubordination-style adjudication with free jazz.64
As Bracey describes it,
free jazz is a useful metaphor in terms of developing a style
or approach to adjudication that attempts to realize
democracy for subordinated groups. When confronted with
a case that demands vindication of the rights and interests of
subordinated groups in the face of majority rule, judges, like
their jazz counterparts, should place freedom (disciplined by
the antisubordination principle) at the center of the
adjudicative enterprise, and approach the task ofjudging with
creativity, commitment, and courage. In cases where the
61. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 107, 157 (1976).
62. See Hernindez, supra note 33, at 1128 n.205 (listing the equalityprovisions
of many Latin American and Caribbean countries).
63. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 8, at 109-119 (describing the few
cases in which judges have used Critical Race Theory to adjudicate a case).
64. Christopher A. Bracey, Adjudication, Antisubordination, and the Jazz
Connection, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 853 (2003).
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rights and interests of members of socially disfavored groups
are in jeopardy, judges should not reflexively indulge the
status quo or the path of least resistance, but act affirmatively
and forthrightly in a manner consistent with the best of the
American constitutional, democratic, and freejazz tradition.65
CONCLUSION:
In short, I propose a Critical Race Theory-infused judicial
training manual and workshop that exposes the existence of the
activist insecurity and openly discusses the concepts of unconscious
racism along with the need for an expansive view of civil rights law
to prevent the actual demise of civil rights laws that John White
discusses. Admittedly a single judicial training session cannot
possibly remedy all the ills of activist insecurity. What is proposed
here is a humble contribution towards practically applying the potent
revelations of Critical Race Theory for judicial reform, in the hopes
of spurring on many more Critical Race Theory-related legal reforms
in the United States and in other regions like Latin America that have
parallel histories of racial hierarchy and the continued presence
unconscious racism influencing the conduct of legal actors.
65. Id. at 875-76 (emphasis added).
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